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Advocates of free trade in the Americas
may have been disappointed last year when the
U.S. Congress denied the president fast-track
authority to pursue trade agreements with other
nations. The main concern of free trade advo-
cates is that this decision will halt, and even re-
verse, the trend toward free trade initiated in the
Americas in the 1980s. This frustration would be
particularly justified if countries in the region
would benefit from mutual trade concessions
but not from a unilateral move to free trade.
Should countries pursue free trade policies
even when their trading partners do not?
Readers familiar with Ricardo’s celebrated com-
parative advantage theory of international trade
would probably say yes.
1 However, contempo-
rary models of international trade do not war-
rant such a clear-cut conclusion. This is the first
of two articles that examine the reasons behind
this ambiguity.
This first article examines the welfare
gains from unilateral trade liberalization sug-
gested by static models of international trade.
The second article will study the welfare gains
from unilateral trade liberalization predicted by
the more realistic (but also more complicated)
dynamic models.
2
A survey of the literature reveals that models
predicting that unilateral free trade will be
harmful to societies rely on a common assump-
tion whose empirical and theoretical founda-
tions have not been convincingly substanti-
ated. Thus, I conclude that, on balance, the
arguments in favor of a unilateral move to free
trade are stronger than those against it.
QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS FROM FREE TRADE
Researchers trying to quantify the effect of
tariff changes on international trade do so in what
seems a logical way: they choose a state-of-the-
art theoretical model deemed appropriate for the
case under study, assign values to the model’s
parameters and variables, and measure its quan-
titative performance under various trade policies.
This was essentially the strategy used to
evaluate the benefits of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for all countries
involved. The so-called general equilibrium
models of trade were the state of the art at that
time. The qualifier “general” differentiates these
models from a previous vintage of “partial”
equilibrium models, which assume prices in
some markets are given and somehow deter-
mined outside the model.
For example, in analyzing the effects of
tariffs, many partial equilibrium models assume
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real wages are fixed. This is highly unrealistic
because tariffs usually alter the demand for fac-
tors of production by the industry or sector
being protected, which in turn is likely to affect
the relative prices of labor and/or capital.
General equilibrium models, instead, allow for
these effects because prices and quantities are
determined endogenously, that is, within the
model.
Theoretical General Equilibrium Models
The first element necessary in evaluating
the benefits from unilateral trade liberalization 
is an appropriate general equilibrium model.
General equilibrium models attempt to mimic as
closely as possible actual economies by con-
structing an artificial (or model) economy the
researcher can experiment with on the com-
puter. This artificial economy is an abstract
mathematical representation of the environment
in which relevant economic agents are thought
to operate and of the decision process by which
those agents are thought to make their choices
of consumption of different goods, of accumu-
lation of capital, and so on. Methodologically,
this implies that any general equilibrium model
must start by specifying endowments, prefer-
ences, and technology.
The specification of preferences is an im-
portant step in formulating a general equilib-
rium model because the ultimate object of
interest is not the outcomes the model produces
but how those outcomes affect society’s welfare.
For example, a reduction of tariffs on 
capital goods from x percent to y percent may
double the rate of investment. The resulting
increase in the capital stock will bring about
higher growth, making it tempting to conclude
that this higher growth will benefit society.
However, accumulation of capital requires sav-
ing, which necessarily takes place at the ex-
pense of current consumption. If it were true
that societies are always better off with faster
growth, governments throughout the world
could readily gather the necessary political sup-
port to adopt draconian measures reducing con-
sumption by up to 50 percent. As history has
proved, such a Stalinist approach to growth is
doomed because it will be resisted by current
generations, the ones who have to pay for that
future growth with a drastic reduction in their
consumption.
It is not a given, therefore, that the bene-
fits of a reform (be it a trade reform or a tax
reform) should be measured by the additional
growth eventually made possible by the reform.
Clearly, it would be preferable to measure those
benefits in terms of the additional well-being
the reform brings about. Such a task requires
the construction of an index of well-being, or
welfare, with some ideal properties. Unfortu-
nately, construction of such an ideal index is
impossible, as Nobel Prize recipient Kenneth J.
Arrow (1951) demonstrates in his celebrated im-
possibility theorem. Yet economists are asked to
evaluate the costs and benefits of a reform and,
therefore, must provide a connection between
observable outcomes (such as investment,
growth, or consumption) and some measure of
well-being, however imperfect or debatable.
General equilibrium models assume the
welfare of a typical household provides a good
approximation to social welfare. Such an
approach implicitly assumes all households and
consumers have well-defined preferences over
different economic outcomes and that such
preferences have a mathematical representation;
that is, they can be measured by some utility
function. Usually, this utility function is assumed
to depend on the quantity of goods and services
households consume. The functional form
assumed for the utility functions is not com-
pletely arbitrary. It is in part dictated by restric-
tions imposed by basic axioms of consumer
theory. One such restriction is that consumers
always prefer to have something of every good
rather than a lot of some goods and nothing of
others.
3 In addition, a standard assumption is
that preferences and the utility function that rep-
resents them are identical across households.
This assumption guarantees that the utility func-
tion of any household adequately summarizes
the welfare of all households.
A general equilibrium model exploits
these assumptions by proposing that the repre-
sentative household of a given country derives
welfare from consuming, for example, the only
good produced and exported by the country
(c1) as well as from consuming the only good
imported by the country (c2) and that the wel-
fare this representative consumer obtains from
different bundles of these goods can be mea-
sured by a welfare or utility function such as
(1) Welfare of representative consumer
= α 1 log c1 + α 2 log c2,
where α 1 and α 2 are parameters that measure
the relative importance the representative con-
sumer attaches to each good in his preferences.
Given the focus of this article, it is worth-
while to note that the level of tariffs does not
appear explicitly in Equation 1. Changes in tar-
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appear only indirectly in the welfare function, to
the extent that they induce changes in the out-
comes (such as the consumption level) over
which consumers define their preferences.
4
Another important element in the abstract
construct of general equilibrium models is the
postulate that economic agents act purposefully
to achieve the ends they seek. Consistent with
this methodological approach, households are
assumed to maximize their level of welfare, or
utility (as measured by the utility function), sub-
ject to the limitation imposed by their income or
budget constraint. The budget constraint is a
mathematical representation of the common-
sense principle that households cannot spend
more than their revenues from all sources (cap-
ital and labor income, savings carried over from
the past, credit).
The consumer’s maximization problem
described above is not trivial because con-
sumers can purchase different consumption
bundles with their available income, but not all
those bundles deliver the same level of utility.
The solution to the problem requires finding the
consumption bundle that allows the consumer
to achieve the maximum possible welfare at
given prices. Solving the problem repeatedly for
different prices usually delivers well-defined
demand functions—the standard, textbook,
downward-sloping demand curve for each
good. (For a more formal presentation, see the
box titled “The Decision Problem of Consumers
and Firms in General Equilibrium Models.”)
Notice that changes in tariffs will generally
change the prices of the goods from which con-
sumers obtain utility. The price changes will
alter the budget constraint, which may in turn
change not only the consumption bundle that
maximizes welfare but the level of welfare it-
self. That eventual shift in welfare induced by
changes in tariffs is what general equilibrium
models seek to measure.
A partial equilibrium model would stop the
analysis here, in what could be referred to as the
consumers’, or demand, side of the economy.
However, the endogenous determination of equi-
librium prices, which result from the interaction
of supply and demand, is in the very nature of
general equilibrium models. Therefore, general
equilibrium models must specify the suppliers’,
or production, side of the economy as well.
To that end, firms are assumed to combine
primary factors of production (labor and capital)
to maximize their profits. The transformation of
these factors into output takes place accord-
ing to some technology, mathematically repre-
sented by a production function.
Unfortunately, an issue of controversy
among economists is whether production func-
tions are characterized by constant returns to
scale or increasing returns to scale. A 20 percent
increase of all inputs results in a 20 percent
increase in output under constant returns to
scale but in a, say, 30 percent expansion of out-
put under increasing returns to scale. The con-
troversy is relevant to welfare gains from free
trade because such gains tend to be larger
under increasing returns to scale (see the box
titled “The Decision Problem of Consumers and
Firms in General Equilibrium Models”).
General equilibrium models connect the
household and firm sectors of the economy by
exploiting the fact that households are the ulti-
mate owners of the factors of production—
labor and capital—and, therefore, the ultimate
recipients of the factor payments and profits the
firms make.
Finally, the international link in general
equilibrium models of international trade is pro-
vided by assuming each country exports those
goods for which domestic output exceeds do-
mestic consumption. The model is one of gen-
eral equilibrium in the sense explained earlier,
that prices are set endogenously at the level
necessary to ensure the quantities supplied and
demanded of all goods, services, and factors are
equal.
Applied General Equilibrium Models
Applied general equilibrium models
attempt to exploit the theoretical framework
offered by general equilibrium models to
answer specific quantitative questions such as
what the welfare gains are from a particular
trade agreement (such as NAFTA) or from uni-
lateral trade liberalizations. A theoretical general
equilibrium model is brought down to earth by
assigning concrete values, for example, to the
parameters α 1 and α 2 in Equation 1.
Another difference between theoretical
general equilibrium models and applied ones is
in the number of economic sectors they can
handle. Theoretical models are concerned with
analytical and general results, which are almost
impossible to derive in a large model. By con-
trast, applied models are more interested in
quantitative answers to specific problems and
situations. Free from the obligation to deliver
general results and theorems, applied general
equilibrium models can specify a large number
of economic sectors, as many as necessary to
accomplish the desired level of realism, the only
limitation being the computational ability to
solve the model numerically.
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The Decision Problem of Consumers and Firms
in General Equilibrium Models
Any general equilibrium model that attempts
to measure the impact of trade policies on welfare
must start by postulating the utility, or welfare, func-
tion of the representative household populating the
artificial, or model, economy.
For example, Harris (1984) proposed to 
evaluate the welfare effects of trade liberalization
according to the following utility, or social welfare,
function:
(B.1) Welfare = ∑ i α i log ci,
where ci is the real consumption of good i and 
the summation is over all goods i, and α i is a para-
meter that measures the importance of good i in
households’ preferences.
General equilibrium models postulate that eco-
nomic agents act purposefully to achieve the ends
they seek. Hence, households are assumed to maxi-
mize their level of welfare, or utility (as measured by
the utility function), subject to a budget constraint.
In Harris’ study, the representative household
is endowed with an exogenous real income I.The
consumer’s problem can be represented, in the
abstraction of a general equilibrium model, as the
problem of maximizing Equation B.1 subject to the
budget constraint
∑ i pi ci ≤ I,
which says that the sum of the price (in real terms)
times the quantity purchased of each good (total
expenditures) over all goods should not exceed
total real income I.
1
Several consumption bundles will satisfy the
budget constraint above, but only one will maxi-
mize the preferences, or welfare, given by Equation
B.1.The consumer’s decision problem consists of
finding such a bundle. In this example, a standard
first-order-conditions approach delivers the answer
mathematically.
Notice that removal of international trade tariffs
will generally change prices and thus the budget
constraint and optimal consumption bundle.Through
this channel the imposition or removal of tariffs
affects welfare in general equilibrium models.
Recall that, in this type of model, prices are
not taken as coming from outside the model but
rather determined inside the model from the inter-
action of supply and demand.The demand side of
the economy is characterized by the consumer’s
maximization problem just described, while the
supply, or production, side is characterized by the
firm’s maximization problem described below.
General equilibrium models assume that firms
combine primary factors of production (labor and
capital) to maximize their profits.The transforma-
tion of capital and labor into output takes place
according to some technology, mathematically 
represented by a production function.
To this end, the profits of a typical firm (or in-
dustry) i are represented mathematically as
Profits = pi yi – wli – rki,
where pi yi represents the firm’s revenues (from
selling a quantity yi of good i at real price pi) and
the second and third terms are the costs of pro-
ducing output yi , where wli represents the labor
costs associated with hiring li hours of labor at the
hourly real wage w and rki the cost of renting ki
units of capital at the rental price r.
2
The technological constraint, in turn, is repre-
sented as
Output of firm i = yi = F(li, ki),
where F is some function of li and ki. As explained
in the text, the nature of that function is a contro-
versial issue. In particular, there is disagreement as
to whether the production function F of the typical
firm is characterized by constant returns to scale or
increasing returns to scale.
For example, a possible mathematical repre-
sentation of the production function F is




where A > 0, ki is the level of capital, li is the
amount of labor input and γ 1 > 0 and γ 2 > 0 are
parameters. When γ 1 + γ 2 = 1, the above produc-
tion function is constant returns to scale, as the
reader can verify by multiplying capital and labor
by the same percentage increase x. In that case:
which says increasing each input by x percent
results in an increased output of also x percent.
Note, however, that with γ 1 + γ 2 > 1, this
same production function becomes increasing
returns to scale: an increase of x percent in each
input results in a larger proportional increase of
output—specifically, in an increase of
Unfortunately, theoretical considerations do
not permit exclusion of either case, and the empiri-
cal evidence is mixed.This is somewhat problem-
atic because, as stated in the text, gains from free
trade tend to be larger under increasing than under
constant returns to scale.
Finally, note that in general equilibrium mod-
els the household and firm sectors are connected
because households’ real income I (the right-hand
side of their budget constraint) is nothing but the
sum of the firms’ profits and their payments to
labor and capital inputs.
1 Implicitly, all nominal quantities (prices and income) are
being deflated by a common price index P.
2 The rental price of capital, r, is generally given by the


















































































.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 18
Once the researcher has defined the utility
function, the production functions, the number
of sectors to be considered, and concrete values
for the relevant parameters, it is possible to
quantify the impact of a policy change by com-
puting the model for different trade policies.
The different policies’ impact on welfare is then
analyzed by reporting, for example, that in the
artificial economy the welfare gains after the
policy change are such that GDP should be x
percent higher to achieve that same welfare
without a reform. This measure is often referred
to as the equivalent variation in income.
Different applied general equilibrium
models give different qualitative answers to the
question of whether unilateral free trade is a
wise policy. These differences extend  to the
quantitative importance of the welfare gains or
losses from such a move. The remainder of this
article examines the details of the models re-
sponsible for those discrepancies.
STATIC APPLIED GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
MODELS OF FREE TRADE
Static applied general equilibrium models
ignore the time dimension. The artificial econo-
mies of these models have no past or present
and, therefore, no incentive to save or lend. As
a consequence, countries cannot run a current
account balance or trade deficit.
For purposes of exposition, and following
the classification Brown (1992) proposed, the
static applied general equilibrium models of
unilateral trade liberalization can be grouped
into two categories: first- and second-generation
(Figure 1). First-generation models have in
common two assumptions: the national product
differentiation assumption and the constant-
returns-to-scale assumption. The second-genera-
tion models replace the national product dif-
ferentiation assumption with the monopolistic
competition assumption, and the constant-
returns-to-scale assumption with the increasing-
returns-to-scale assumption. The remainder of this
section analyzes how those assumptions affect
the different welfare results from unilateral trade
liberalization delivered by those models.
The Role of the National Product Differentiation
and Constant-Returns-to-Scale Assumptions
Because their focus is empirical rather
than analytical, applied general equilibrium
models must be able to interpret actual data as
Figure 1
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reported in official or private statistics. Unfor-
tunately, available data are often not the exact
empirical counterpart of a concept or definition
used in the theoretical model. This discrepancy
may force a compromise between theory and
reality that can weaken confidence in the empir-
ical results of a model.
In the case of international trade, re-
searchers formulating theoretical models would
like to make the sensible assumption that con-
sumers don’t discriminate goods by their origin.
In other words, consumers value a good sup-
plied by one country as much as the same good
produced by another country. The assumption
that a good is a perfect substitute in demand
across origins seems natural in any model deal-
ing with international trade. One empirical im-
plication of this perfect-substitution assumption
is that countries will import goods different
from those they export, because countries typi-
cally export their production surplus after satis-
fying domestic demand for the good.
Under this perfect-substitution assumption
we shouldn’t see, as we do, trade statistics
reporting that Germany and Japan import and
export cars. Actually, the cars Germany imports
differ from those it exports. Germany may
export BMWs to Japan and import Hondas or
Toyotas from Japan. Less obvious distinctions
can be made as well. For example, a country
may export two-door cars and import four-door
cars; it may import cars with sunroofs and
export cars without them, and so on. However,
because such details are lost in trade statistics, it
may appear as if countries import and export
the same kind of goods. This seemingly puz-
zling situation, known among international
trade scholars as the cross-hauling problem,
occurs not because the perfect-substitution
assumption is unrealistic but because of the way
trade data are recorded. There are hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of varieties of cars, and
trade statistics should report, strictly speaking,
exports and imports for each of them. But pro-
cessing the information in such detail would 
be costly; in practice, many kinds of cars are
grouped under broad categories. This renders
impractical theoretical models based on the 
perfect-substitution assumption.
On the other hand, the nature of the prob-
lem suggests the way around it. If trade statistics
fail to recognize that a good being imported is
not actually the same as the good being ex-
ported, the solution is to assume that goods
reported as both exported and imported are
really different. In other words, the solution is to
assume goods differ not only by type but also
by origin. This means, following our example,
that cars produced abroad are not the same as
cars produced domestically, which is a rather in-
genious way to distinguish the BMWs Germany
exports from the Toyotas Germany imports.
This is the national product differentiation
assumption adopted by the first generation of
applied general equilibrium models.
6
The national product differentiation
assumption implies that the goods produced by
each country are unique and, therefore, cannot
be perfectly substituted by any of the goods
produced by any other country. Although this
assumption solves the problem of the lack of
correspondence between data and theory other-
wise present with the assumption of perfect
substitution of goods across origins, it intro-
duces a new problem: now countries have
monopoly power over the goods they produce.
The reason, of course, is that no other country
can produce the same good. In the logic of this
assumption, in a world where there are n prod-
ucts and m countries, there will be n*m goods.
Most first-generation applied general equi-
librium models of international trade combine
the national product differentiation assumption
with a constant-returns-to-scale technology. The
combination of these two assumptions has 
serious theoretical and quantitative implications
for the analysis of trade liberalization because,
in the presence of market power, only imposing
tariffs—not reducing them—improves a coun-
try’s welfare.
The assumption of constant returns to
scale is important because it keeps the market
power at the country rather than at the firm
level. Under constant returns to scale, the mar-
ginal cost is constant, independent of the level
of production. Therefore, all firms will supply
their outputs at a price equal to the constant
marginal cost. Any attempt by an individual firm
to set a higher price will divert its customers to
competitors. Of course, no firm will set prices
below marginal cost because it would be pro-
ducing at a loss. None of the firms can, individ-
ually, exploit the market power implicit in the
fact that no other country can produce the same
products they do. Thus, the government can
intervene by coordinating the firms’ actions to
enable them to exploit their market power. For
instance, the imposition of a tax (tariff) on for-
eign goods will increase the domestic price of
imports relative to the domestically produced—
and eventually also exported—good. The lower
relative price of the domestic good will induce
more consumption of it and less of the imported
good, producing two effects. On the one hand,FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 20
it will reduce the demand for the foreign good
by the tariff-imposing country and, therefore,
generate downward pressure on the world price
of that good. On the other hand, it will reduce
the surplus of the domestic good available for
export to world markets, which will increase the
international price of the good. This implies that
the terms of trade—that is, the international
price of exports relative to that of imports—
shift in favor of the tariff-imposing country. (For
a more detailed explanation of this result, see
the box titled “Optimal Tariff Under the National
Product Differentiation Assumption.”)
Reversing the argument, the unilateral
removal of a tariff can worsen the terms of trade
and be welfare-reducing, especially if the tariff
had been at the level at which a country ex-
ploits its market power the most.
Welfare Gains from Unilateral Trade 
Liberalization in First-Generation Applied 
General Equilibrium Models
The few static applied general equilibrium
models that have attempted to measure the
gains of unilateral trade liberalization for a small
country have indeed found negligible, or even
negative, welfare gains from a unilateral move
to free trade. Boadway and Treddenick (1978)
found that removal of tariffs in Canada would
cause welfare to decline by about 1 percent or
increase by only 0.06 percent. The terms-of-trade
deterioration resulting from an import tariff
reduction, as implied by the national product
differentiation assumption, has led Brown (1987)
to conclude rather categorically that unilateral
trade liberalization is rarely welfare-improving,
even for a small country, in this first generation
of static applied general equilibrium models.
It is important to remember, in evaluating
those disappointing welfare results for the cause
of free trade, that the motivation for the national
product differentiation in first-generation applied
general equilibrium models was mainly prag-
matic, an apparently innocuous way to bridge
the gap between theory and available data.
7
However, this compromise may not appear as
appealing when it becomes apparent that the
assumption, in combination with constant re-
turns to scale, implies that a country (not its
industries) has complete monopoly power in
the market for its exports and that this market
power introduces a bias against trade liberaliza-
tion. This bias would not be problematic if the
market power implication of the national prod-
uct differentiation assumption could be empiri-
cally validated, but this may not always be the
case. These considerations led to the formula-
tion of second-generation static applied general
equilibrium models, which replace the assump-
tion of national product differentiation with the
monopolistic competition assumption. The next
section explains why second-generation models
deliver somewhat higher welfare gains from
unilateral trade liberalization.
The Role of Monopolistic Competition and
Increasing Returns to Scale
To correct the country-monopoly-power
side effect introduced by the national product
differentiation assumption, many authors have
replaced it with the assumption that each firm,
rather than each country, produces a different
product, transferring the monopoly power from
the country to the firm level. This monopoly
power is limited, however, by the fact that con-
sumers can easily substitute the products of one
firm with close varieties of the same good pro-
duced by another firm. Technically, each firm
produces an imperfect-substitute good under
monopolistic competition conditions.
Because each firm specializes in the pro-
duction of a good no other firm can produce,
the firm is able to exploit its market power on
its own, without the help of an import tariff
levied by the government. That is, firms exploit
their market power as much as they can before
any tariff is imposed. Consequently, the imposi-
tion of a tariff under monopolistic competition
will be not only redundant but also, in general,
detrimental to society. Not surprisingly, applied
general equilibrium models relying on monopo-
listic competition will tend to find that unilateral
removal of tariffs is welfare-improving.
The introduction of monopolistic competi-
tion in applied general equilibrium models
solves the same problem the national product
differentiation assumption does and at the same
time avoids this assumption bias against unilat-
eral trade liberalization. In particular, monopo-
listic competition can still account for the con-
siderable cross-hauling observed in trade statis-
tics. The puzzling observation that a country
appears to export the same product it imports
can be interpreted as a domestic firm producing
(and exporting) a variety of the product differ-
ent from the one being imported.
Unfortunately, the monopolistic competi-
tion assumption has a drawback the national
product differentiation assumption does not
have: it implies that each product variety will be
produced by one and just one firm. This impli-
cation is problematic because it conflicts with
the standard assumption of constant-returns-to-
scale production technology.21 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1999
Recall that a constant-returns-to-scale tech-
nology can deliver a given percentage change
in the output of a good by simply changing all
the inputs by that same percentage. This means
any level of output QN of a certain good can be
produced either by a single firm or by any num-
ber N of identical firms, each of them using 1/N
fewer inputs than a single firm would to pro-
duce  QN. In other words, under constant re-
turns to scale the output of any firm can be
replicated by N smaller and alike firms, yet this
technologically natural possibility would be
ruled out by the monopolistic competition
assumption that each product can be produced
by only one firm.
To save the contradiction of simultane-
ously assuming product differentiation and a
constant-returns-to-scale technology at the firm
level, most trade models appealing to monopo-
listic competition also assume the technology is
increasing returns to scale. Equivalently, second-
generation applied general equilibrium models
of international trade assume the total produc-
tion cost is composed of two parts: a fixed cost
independent of the level of production and a
variable cost proportional to the level of output.
In its simplest form, this assumption takes
the mathematical representation
Total cost = F + bQ,
where F is the fixed cost and b the cost of an
additional unit of output Q —that is, the mar-
ginal cost. Krugman (1979) uses this formulation
to show how increasing returns to scale can
account for international trade. What is impor-
tant about this technological specification is that
the average cost declines with the level of out-
put. This can be seen easily by dividing the
above equation by the level of output
Average cost = TC/Q = F/Q + b.
Since F is a fixed number, the ratio F/Q declines
as Q, the level of output, increases, thus reduc-
ing overall average cost. This is exactly what
one would expect from a technology under
which a given percentage increase in inputs
(and, therefore, in costs) delivers an even
higher proportional increase in output.
The shape of the average cost curve of a
hypothetical firm with an increasing-returns-to-
scale technology is depicted in Figure 2, which
also displays the hypothetical demand curve for
the good produced by the hypothetical firm.
The figure suggests one of the main implica-
tions of the increasing-returns-to-scale assump-
tion: only one firm will produce each good.
To see why, suppose the hypothetical firm
of Figure 2 produces all output of a given good.
The market equilibrium for that good will occur
at the price Pe, where the firm will be able to
satisfy the quantity demanded Qe and at the
same time cover the costs of doing so, since the
price Pe equals the average cost at that level of
output.
Now suppose N firms were going to sup-
ply the market. As in the case of constant
returns to scale, each of them will operate at a
lower scale than a single firm. But unlike in the
constant-returns-to-scale case, the average cost
for each of the firms will be higher than it
would be for a single firm. This implies they
would have to charge a higher price than the
single firm would, that is, a price higher than
Pe. Realizing this, at least one of these firms
sooner or later will try to capture competi-
tors’ customers by cutting the price to Pe. Such
a firm will be able to sustain this lower price
without losing money because it will now sup-
ply the whole market, and under increasing
returns to scale it will be able to produce that
larger quantity at the lower average cost Pe.
8
The prediction that just one firm will pro-
duce each good under increasing returns to
scale is logically consistent with the monopolis-
tic competition assumption that each good will
be produced by only one firm. For this reason,
second-generation applied general equilibrium
models adopted the increasing-returns-to-scale
assumption along with the monopolistic com-
petition approach.
Figure 2
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Optimal Tariff Under the National Product Differentiation Assumption
This box explains in more detail why the optimal tariff
tends to be strictly positive in models of international trade
that use the national production differentiation assumption
when the production function at the firm level is assumed
to be constant returns to scale.
To keep the discussion as nontechnical as possible,
it will be presented in terms of standard graphical repre-
sentations of the welfare function and budget constraint,
although a more rigorous mathematical representation is
possible and available in many advanced international
trade textbooks.
1
Figure B.1 presents the standard two-dimensional
representation of a welfare function such as that in
Equation 1 in the text. Each of the curves in the figure
traces the combinations of the quantities consumed of
good 1 (c1) and of good 2 (c2) that allow the typical con-
sumer of a given country (let’s say the home country) to
attain the same level of utility or welfare. For example, the
curve labeled U = 4.61 represents the different pairs (c1,
c2) from which the consumer can derive a utility level of
4.61 when preferences are represented mathematically
by Equation 1, with parameter values α 1 = α 2 = 0.5.
The reader can verify, using Equation 1, that the same
level of welfare can be attained with the consumption
pairs c1 = 50 and c2 = 200,  c1 = 100 and c2 = 100, or 
c1 = 200 and c2 = 50.
The straight line running from A to B in Figure B.1 is
a geometric representation of the typical consumer’s sta-
tic budget constraint of the home country for the case of
two goods.This line represents the different quantities c1
and c2 of each good the home country consumer can
afford to buy when his income (in terms of good 1) equals
A and the relative price of good 1 in terms of good 2 is
0.5. In what follows, and in line with the national product
differentiation assumption, it will be assumed that the
home country is the only world producer of good 1 and
the foreign country is the only producer of good 2.
Now suppose the typical consumer of the home
country is endowed with A units of good 1 and none of
good 2. Because preferences are concave, meaning con-
sumers have a taste for variety, the typical home country
consumer would like some quantity of good 2 as well.
However, according to the national product differentiation
assumption, the home country is unable to produce good
2, so it is willing to trade part of its endowment of good 1
in exchange for some amount of good 2 produced by the
foreign country. When the relative price, or terms of trade,
of the home good (export) in terms of the foreign good
(import) is 0.5 as assumed, trade between the home and
foreign country will take place at the ratio of one unit of
good 1 for half a unit of good 2.
2 These particular terms of
trade are represented in Figure B.1 by the slope of the
budget constraint.This can be verified in the figure: when
the typical home country consumer gives up consumption
of 100 units of good 1, represented by the movement
from A to C, the home country can export those 100 units
to get in exchange 50 units of good 2, represented by the
vertical distance D – C.
The home country consumers will keep trading good
1 for good 2 until they maximize their satisfaction or wel-
fare, which will occur at point E1 in the figure. Of all the
combinations of c1 and c2 the consumer can afford with
the budget AB, the one at point E1 yields the highest level
of welfare.This implies that the home country will con-
sume the quantity F of good 1, export the quantity A – F
of that good—the excess of endowment of good 1 over
the domestic consumption of good 1—and import the
quantity G of good 2.
In the above example, the terms of trade were arbi-
trarily set at 0.5. But of course an entirely analogous
analysis applies to any terms of trade. Figure B.2 repre-
sents a set of indifference curves along with several budget
lines, each with a different slope and corresponding to 
different terms of trade.The dotted line represents the
baseline case of the previous example in which the terms
of trade were assumed to be 0.5. Budget lines above the
dotted line represent improvements in the terms of trade
for the home country with respect to the baseline case.
For example, the budget line running from A to H has a
slope of 1, which is greater than 0.5. At that budget line,
the home country can trade each unit of the good it pro-
duces for one unit of the good it does not.This means the
home country good (good 1) is now more valuable than
before: it is worth as much as the imported good instead
of only half, as it was when the terms of trade were 0.5. Of
course, the home country consumers will benefit from the
fact that the home good is more valuable relative to the
foreign good.This improvement is reflected in that, with
the new budget constraint AH, the optimal consumption 
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Optimal Tariff Under the National Product Differentiation Assumption (continued)
with a higher level of welfare than at E1, the point repre-
senting the welfare-maximizing consumption pair when
the terms of trade were 0.5.
The above analysis suggests that a country can im-
prove its situation if it can influence the terms of trade in its
favor.The imposition of a tariff under the national product
differentiation assumption can do just that. Under this
assumption each country has market power over the goods
it produces because no other country produces those goods.
To see how a tariff can improve a country’s situation,
let’s consider the baseline example when the terms of
trade were 0.5. Now suppose the home country imposes
a tariff of 50 percent on the imported good (good 2). For
practical purposes, the imposition of a tariff implies that a
certain amount of the imported good will have to be sur-
rendered to customs officials. In this case, a tariff of 50 per-
cent means that now each consumer will get 0.25 units of
good 2 for each exported unit of good 1.The government
will get to keep the remaining 0.25 unit. However, this
analysis is valid only if the terms of trade remain the same
after the imposition of the tariff, which is unlikely because
the tariff makes the imported good more expensive relative
to the home good for the home country consumers.They
will consume less of the imported good and more of the
exported good.The lower home country consumption of the
imported good will put downward pressure on the world
price of imports. Meanwhile, the higher domestic con-
sumption of the home good will reduce the surplus of it
available for export and put upward pressure on its inter-
national price. A fall in import prices and a rise in export
prices will improve the terms of trade for the tariff-impos-
ing country.
Suppose then that the imposition of a 50 percent tariff
on good 2 by the country producing good 1 results in a
100 percent improvement in its terms of trade. In other
words, suppose the terms of trade move from 0.5 to 1 as
a result of the tariff.The new budget constraint implied by
these new terms of trade for the home country consumers
is represented in Figure B.3 by an outward movement of
the budget line from AB to AH. At these new prices, the
typical household of the home country will export A – F
units of good 1, receive in exchange D units of good 2,
surrender half this amount, D – G, to customs, and keep
the remaining half, G, for its own use. From the home
country consumer’s perspective, nothing has changed.
He still receives half a unit of good 2 for each unit of good
1 he exports (or, equivalently, for each unit of good 1 he
does not consume).The optimal consumption combina-
tion will still be represented by point E1, where the typical
household attains the same level of welfare as before the
imposition of the tariff.
It would appear, then, that imposing the tariff was a
futile policy move. However, the country as a whole is
richer because now the government has extra revenues,
represented by import duties D – G collected by customs.
The government can use the additional income to upgrade
public services. Or it can return the revenues to house-
holds in the form of higher pensions, social security bene-
fits, or income tax reductions.The households, in turn,
can use this tax rebate to increase purchases of both
goods 1 and 2 and, therefore, to attain higher levels of
utility than represented by point E1.The home country’s
welfare is improved after the tariff because the govern-
ment successfully transfers the burden of the tariff to for-
eigners by altering the terms of trade against them.
3
Of course, this example was designed to deliver wel-
fare gains from a tariff. It is also possible that the terms-
of-trade gain from a 50 percent tariff is too small to
compensate the home country for the distortionary costs
from a tariff.The ultimate benefit of a tariff depends on,
among other things, the elasticities of demand for the
home and foreign products both at home and abroad.The
details are beyond the scope of this article; however, the
interested reader is referred to Brown (1987), in which it
is also argued that, empirically, most models using the
national product differentiation assumption produce
terms-of-trade gains strong enough to improve the welfare
of the tariff-imposing country.
It may seem odd that a society can gain from imposing
a tariff. After all, a tax on imports—like any other tax—is,
in principle, welfare-decreasing. However, this outcome
ignores the presence of an externality under the national
product differentiation assumption: the country has a mar-
ket power that its firms cannot exploit at an individual level
when their production technology is constant returns to
scale.This sort of externality justifies the government in-
tervention. Under those circumstances, a tariff turns out to
be corrective rather than distortive. By imposing a tariff, the
government implicitly forces the home country firms and
households to coordinate their actions to produce and con-
sume, in the aggregate, the quantity of good 1 at which
the home country exploits its market power the most.
The result that the optimal tariff is eventually positive
will tend to disappear, therefore, in models that assume
increasing returns to scale at the firm level or that aban-
don the national product differentiation assumption and its
implicit market power. In the first case, as explained in the
text, each firm will be able to exploit its market power on
the differentiated good it produces, without the need for
the government to step in. In the second case, many dif-
ferent countries will be producing each good; therefore,
no individual country will have control over the market of
any particular good. However, in face of the considerable
amount of cross-hauling of goods across borders reported
in international trade data, abandoning the national product
differentiation assumption may be problematic for address-
ing some quantitative questions in international trade.
1 See, for example, Grubel (1977), especially chap. 8, p. 155.
2 These terms of trade imply that the good produced by the home
country is worth, in dollar terms, half the price of good 2.
3 Notice that now the foreign country receives less for its exports
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As previously explained, compared with
national product differentiation, monopolistic
competition is more favorable in principle to the
case of free trade because in such an environ-
ment firms incorporate their market power in
their price decisions, so no corrective govern-
ment tariff is needed.
This intuition is rigorously confirmed by
Harris (1984), who finds that welfare gains from
unilateral trade liberalization are nil in the 
models with just national product differentiation
and constant returns to scale, whereas they are
in the range of 2.7 percent to 4.1 percent of
GDP when some of the goods are produced
under conditions of monopolistic competition
and increasing returns to scale.
Although the gains from unilateral trade
liberalization delivered by second-generation
applied general equilibrium models are positive,
they are far from staggering. After all, a gain in
GDP of 3 percent to 4 percent is in the same
order of magnitude as the normal annual GDP
growth for many developed countries.
CONCLUSION
Static applied general equilibrium models
fail to deliver the eye-popping gains from uni-
lateral trade liberalization that free trade advo-
cates often promise. As this conclusion applies
to both first- and second-generation models, it
appears to be rather robust to the significantly
different assumptions about market structure or
technology made by the two generations of 
static models.
However, static models are single-period
models unable to incorporate the important
dimension of time, ruling out savings and in-
vestment. Why should economic agents save and
invest if there is no tomorrow? This is unfortu-
nate in the context of trade liberalization be-
cause reductions of tariffs on, for example, capital
goods, may induce more investment, which will
increase capital stock and, hence, a society’s
ability to produce and consume more in the
future. But static models—having neither past
nor future—will leave out of the equation those
welfare gains from larger future consumption,
which can be far more important than any gains
from larger present consumption. In fact, the
omission of the time dimension may ultimately
explain the negligible welfare gains from unilat-
eral tariff reductions delivered by the static
models examined in this first article. This is pre-
cisely the conjecture that will be more fully
explored in the second article on this topic.
NOTES
1 David Ricardo (1817) was the first economist to argue
that free international trade would be beneficial to two
countries even if one of them produced all traded
goods more efficiently than the other. His key insight
was that what makes international trade desirable is
not this absolute advantage but the comparative or rel-
ative advantage—that is, the efficiency of each coun-
try at producing one good relative to its efficiency at
producing other goods.
2 Static models are those in which the dimension of time
is missing. In such models there is no past or future:
all analysis is conducted as if everything happened at
one time. In contrast, dynamic models do incorporate
the dimension of time in the analysis.
3 In economists’ technical jargon, preferences are con-
cave.
4 Notice also that the utility function given in Equation 1
satisfies the taste for variety mentioned in the text, in
the sense that the consumer is always better off con-
suming a little of every good than a lot of one good
and nothing of others. Demonstrated mathematically,
the consumer would get an infinitely negative utility by
consuming nothing of some good because in that
case log 0 = –∞ .
5 This is why applied general equilibrium models are
also referred to in the literature as computable general
equilibrium models.
6 Because Armington (1969) was the first to propose
this assumption, it is often referred to in the literature
as the Armington assumption.
7 Another reason for the introduction of the national
product differentiation assumption is that slight
changes in tariffs tend to produce unrealistically large
moves toward specialization in models making the
opposite assumption that products are homogeneous
across countries (see Shoven and Whalley, 1984, 
p. 1035).
8 Readers familiar with the literature will recognize this
argument as basically the contestable markets hypoth-
esis often posed to question the effective market
power of potential monopolies and their ability to
depart too much from competitive outcomes.
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